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Waddle: Mu'Min v. Virginia

MU'MIN V. VIRGINIA: 1 SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS DO NOT COMPEL CONTENT QUESTIONS
IN ASSESSING JUROR IMPARTIALITY
INTRODUCTION

A trial judge's refusal to question prospective jurors in a capital murder case
about the specific contents of the news reports to which they had been exposed
does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, or his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.2
Although precise inquiries about the contents of any news reports that
a potential juror has read might reveal a sense of the juror's general
outlook on life...such questions are constitutionally compelled only if
the trial court's failure to ask them renders the defendant's trial
fundamentally unfair.3

In Mu'Min v. Virginia the Supreme Court considered whether a trial court
is constitutionally obligated to ask jurors who admitted exposure to prejudicial
pretrial publicity to identify precisely what they had seen, read, or heard.4 The
Court conceded in Mu'Min that a criminal defendant may properly ask on voir
dire whether a juror has acquired any information about the case, but in Mu'Min
it narrowed this privilege to a mere entitlement to know whether a juror, based
on his own self-assessment, can remain impartial despite previously obtained
information.5 Mu'Min objected to the court's refusal to allow individual voir dire
of those jurors admitting to prior knowledge of the case.6 However, his
arguments fell short in view of the rule that juror questioning must be left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.7 Mu'min contended that the prospective
jurors' knowledge, attitudes, and opinions about the case would aid the court in
determining impartiality. "
This note synopsizes the Supreme Court's prior decisions regarding the
adequacy of voir dire in capital cases surrounded by prejudicial pretrial publicity.
This note will then discuss Mu'Min and explore the weaknesses in the Court's
I111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
Id. at 1903-08.

2

' Id. at 1900 (citation omitted).
4 Id. at 1908.
5

Id.

6 Id. at 1903.
7 Id. at 1903-04.
1 Id. at 1905.
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analogies to its prior decisions. Next, the note will propose arguments in favor
of mandating content questioning. Finally, this note will explore possible
nonconstitutional reasons for requiring content questioning in cases where juror
partiality should be presumed.
BACKGROUND

The American criminal justice system has long recognized the unreliability
of jurors' assessments of their own impartiality in high publicity cases.9
Foreshadowing the Supreme Court's concerns about jurors' self-assessments of
partiality, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as trial judge in U.S. v. Burr'° noted the
inherent danger of seating a prospective juror with preconceptions about the case
to be tried. He observed that protestations of neutrality cannot be trusted.
Why do personal prejudices constitute a just cause of challenge? Solely
because the individual who is under their influence is presumed to have
a bias on his mind which will prevent an impartial decision of the case,
according to the testimony. He may declare that notwithstanding these
prejudices he is determined to listen to the evidence, and be governed
by it; but the law will not trust him."
This mistrust for juror self-assessments has continued to weave its way into the
Court's decisions over the years since Burr. Further, growing
media interference
2
surrounding criminal trials has exacerbated this mistrust.1
It is well established in criminal jurisprudence that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
indifferent jurors. 3 The theory underlying this protection is that the jury's
verdict in any case must be induced only by the evidence presented in open court,
and not by any outside influences. 4 This right becomes even more pronounced

9 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (No. 14, 692g 1807).

10 1Id.
11Id. at 50.
12 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). This federal habeas corpus petition considered the
question of whether Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial after his state conviction for the second-degree

murder of his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive,
pervasive, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. The Supreme Court concluded that he
did not receive a fair trial consistent with Fourteenth Amendment due process.
13 See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931). The majority held that in putting questions to
prospective jurors, court's restrictions upon inquiries at the request of counsel are subject to the essential
demands of fairness. See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984). Likewise,
the Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury. See Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589 (1976).

"4Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/9
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when the issue is one of life or death as in Mu'Min.15
The introduction of the media into the already appetizing atmosphere
surrounding capital murder cases has provided an additional crucial element with
which courts must contend in attempting to preserve a defendant's right to a fair
trial. Courts must take greater pains to insure that when a defendant's life is at
stake, he is tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by huge "wave[s] of public
passion."' 6 Hence, due process in capital cases requires a watchful trial judge
eager to prevent prejudicial occurrences, and to determine the effect of such
occurrences when they happen.' 7 A defendant's guilt or innocence is never to
be determined "on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody,
or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial."'18
Supreme Court's Analysis Of Sixth And FourteenthAmendment
Fair Trial And ImpartialJury Guarantees In High Trials
Thirty years ago in Irvin v. Dowd,19 the Court considered a constitutional
attack upon an alleged violation of due process. Irvin based his claim on the trial
court's failure to protect him from a "carnival" atmosphere created by press
coverage."0
The Supreme Court vacated Irvin's sentence because the jury's
partiality failed to accord him a fair trial under minimal due process standards.2 '
As in Mu'Min, the crimes in Irvin gained extensive media coverage and aroused
much excitement throughout the locality. 22 The exhibits presented at trial
indicated that a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons, and pictures
were unleashed against Irvin during the months preceding trial.23 The Court did
not dispute that jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues
involved. Rather, it found that it is sufficient if a juror can set aside his opinion
and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. 2' The Court did,
however, question the sufficiency of such a subjective rule in guaranteeing due

"Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314.
6
17

rvin, 366 U.S. at 728.
See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
'9 366 U.S. at 717.
20 Id. at 720. The Court considered Irvin's habeas corpus petition in order to test the validity of his
Is

murder conviction and subsequent death sentence.
2" Id. Irvin's conviction by an Indiana Circuit Court was confirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court See
Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384 (1958). 139 N.E.2d 898 (1958), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 948 (1958). The Court
of Appeals upheld the validity of IND. CODE ANN. § 9-1305 (Burns 1956) as allowing a second change
of venue in order to secure an inparial jury trial. Irvin v. Dowd, 251 F. 2d 548 (7th Cir. 1958). rev'd,

359 U.S. 394 (1959).
"2Irvin,366 U.S. at 719-20.
3

24

Id.

1d. at 723.
Published
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process. Accordingly, the Court announced its own test for insuring due process
during voir dire: "whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such
as in law necessarily...raise the presumption of partiality," 25 with the burden
placed on the defendant to show the actual existence of such an opinion.2 6
In Irvin, the presiding trial judge examined the members of the jury panel
whom the petitioner insisted should be excused for cause. Each one indicated
that, notwithstanding his opinion, he could render an impartial verdict.27 Eight
of the twelve jurors finally selected admitted that they thought petitioner was
guilty, and that they could not give him the benefit of the doubt.2 8 In light of
these circumstances, the Court held Irvin's trial did not meet constitutional
standards according to its "nature and strength" test,2 9 and freed Irvin from his
death sentence.30 Though Irvin does not lay down a particular test or procedure
for determining a juror's mental attitude, it does provide an important constitutional framework for assessing Mu'Min.
3 l, another murder/robbery
More than a decade later in Murphy v. Florida
case involving extensive press coverage, the Court stretched the Irvin concepts.
The Court concluded that a prospective juror's own assurances of impartiality
cannot be dispositive of an accused's rights.32 Murphy stood for the proposition
that jurors' indicia of impartiality may be presumptively set aside in cases where
the atmosphere in the community or courtroom is sufficiently inflammatory. In
all other cases, any exposure to publicity about the defendant's prior convictions
or current crime must be viewed with the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the trial was fundamentally unfair.33 Contrary to the outcome
in Irvin, the Court affirmed Murphy's conviction because none of the jurors
exhibited an actual predisposition against him such as would suggest impermissible partiality.' However, the common thread running between Irvin and Murphy
is clear: the defendants were permitted at voir dire to demonstrate the possible
actual existence of any preconceived prejudices.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878).
26Id. at 157.
2

27 Irvin,

366 U.S. at 724.

21 Id. at 728.
29

id.

30 id.

3' 421 U.S. 794 (1975). The defendant's robbery and arrest received extensive press coverage because he

had made himself notorious as "Murph the Surph", a flamboyant criminal known for the 1964 theft of

the Star of Indiana. Id. at 795.
Id. at 800.

32

33 Id. at 799.

' Id. at 803. Of the 78 jurors questioned, only 20 (26%) were excused for having prejudiced petitioner.
Id. at 796. In Irvin, 268 of the 430 (63%) were excused for having fixed opinions, suggesting that they
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/9
4
were part of a community deeply hostile to the accused. 366 U.S. at 727.
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In the fairly recent case of Patton v. Yount, 35the Supreme Court once again
followed the rule announced in Irvin requiring an evaluation of the actual pretrial
publicity to determine the likelihood of an unfair trial.36 Patton involved a
three-year hiatus between petitioner's two trials. 37 The Court deemed this
passage of time lengthy enough to clearly rebut any presumption of partiality or
prejudice created by adverse publicity disseminated during the first trial.38 The
record showed that any prejudicial pretrial publicity existing prior to the first trial
had greatly diminished four years later. Therefore, the trial court had not
committed manifest error in finding that the jury as a whole was impartial.39
Supreme Court's Consideration of Presumed Prejudice
In the 1960's the Court decided two cases, Rideau v. Louisiana,40 and
Sheppard v. Maxwell.4' In both cases the Court presumed juror prejudice
because of pervasive media intrusion both in the community at large and in the
courtroom. In Rideau, a twenty minute film of defendant's "confession" under
police interrogation was broadcast three times by a television station in the
community where the crime and trial took place.4 2 In reversing, the Court did
not even examine the voir dire for evidence of actual prejudice. It found that the
"real trial" had already occurred when the 150,000 people in the community had
seen and heard the defendant admit his guilt on camera.43 The Court affirmed
that these circumstances constituted a denial of Fourteenth Amendment due
process."
Sheppard arose from a trial infected not only by a background of extremely
inflammatory publicity, but also a courtroom given over to accommodate the
public appetite for a carnival. 45 In Sheppard, the Court held that the failure of

15467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
36Id. at 1031.
37 Id. at 1027. At the first trial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that police had violated petitioner's
constitutional rights by securing confessions that had been admitted into evidence. Id.
3, Id. at 1027-28. At the second trial, defendant moved for a change of venue alleging that prejudicial
information could not have been eradicated from the jurors' minds.
39Id. at 1040.
40 373 U.S. 723 (1963). The Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to grant a change of venue
was a denial of due process. Id.
4' 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
42Rideau, 373 U.S. at 724.
43 Id. at 726.
4Id. at 727.
45 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), wherein
the trial was conducted in a circus atmosphere due in large part to the intrusions of the press which was
allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to overrun it with television equipment. The Court held that
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1992
this procedure
inherently lacked due
process. Id. at 542-44.
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a state trial judge in a murder prosecution to protect the defendant from inherently
prejudicial pretrial publicity, which saturated the community, deprived defendant
of a fair trial consistent with due process."
After Patton, Sheppard, Murphy, Rideau, and Irvin,4 7 it appeared that the
issue of content questioning during voir dire had, at the very least, a valid
constitutional foundation.
The Racial Bias Cases
Though distinguishable on their facts, several race discrimination cases figure
prominently in the analysis of Mu'Min. Aldridge v. United States4" and RosalesLopez v. United States4 9 involved black defendants and the right to examine
jurors as to the existence of a disqualifying state of mind with respect to the black
race. In both cases, the lower courts' refusals to permit such examinations were
held to be error.' Ham v. South Carolina,5' Ristaino v. Ross, 52 and Turner
v. Murray"3 also involved black defendants. However, these cases stood for the
proposition that merely because a defendant is black and the victim is white does
not constitutionally mandate an inquiry into racial prejudice unless the facts
suggest a significant 'likelihood that racial prejudice might infect the trial?1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dawud Majid Mu'Min was convicted of murdering Gladys Nopwasky in
Prince William County, Virginia. The murder occurred while he was out of
prison on work detail under the supervision of the Virginia Department of
Transportation(VDOT). The case engendered substantial publicity, and eight of
the twelve venirepersons eventually sworn as jurors answered on voir dire that
they had read or heard something about the case.5 5 The publicity regarding

4Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
47 366 U.S. 717 (1961). Justice Frankfurter reflected the fervor of the idea in Sheppard. He stated...in
his concurrence that "rudimentary conditions for determining guilt are inevitably wanting if the jury which
is to sit in judgment on a fellow human being comes to its task with its mind ineradicably poisoned
against him." Id. at 729 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

"283 U.S. 308 (1931).
49 451 U.S. 182 (1981).

'0Aldridge, 283 U.S.

at 315; Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189-90.

5' 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
52 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
"

476 U.S. 28 (1986).
See, e.g., Turner, 476 U.S. at 30-32 (discussing Ham and Ristaino). Turner has been interpreted as

pertaining to racial prejudice infecting the discretion afforded a jury at the sentencing phase of the capital
trial.
5' Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct 1899, 1901 (1991).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/9
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Mu'Min's crime was frequently front page news, the most incriminating of which
told area residents that their local officials were already convinced of Mu'Min's
guilt.56 The media reports that were allegedly prejudicial contained information
about Mu'Min's prior criminal record,57 accounts of alleged prison infractions, s a comment that the death penalty had not been available at the time
Mu'Min was first convicted, 59 and indications that he had confessed to killing
Mrs. Nopwasky.6° The articles also focused on the laxity in supervision of work
gangs. 61 None of those who had read or heard something about the case and
were eventually seated on the jury indicated that they had formed an opinion
based on outside information, or that it would affect their ability to determine
Mu'Min's guilt or innocence based solely on the evidence adduced at trial.'
Mu'Min was sentenced to death. 63 He appealed the conviction and sentence
on nine separate grounds~to the Virginia Supreme Court. That court affirmed
the decision. Mu'Min then petitioned for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court on
the assertion that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury
trial and due process were violated when the trial judge refused to question
prospective jurors about specific contents of news reports to which they had been
exposed.65
The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the
The Court found that while a criminal
Virginia Supreme Court's ruling.'
defendant may properly ask on voir dire whether a juror has previously acquired
any information about the case, the defendant does not have a constitutional right
to explore the content of that information. 67 Rather, he is only entitled to know
whether the juror can remain impartial in light of the previously obtained

56

Id. at 1912.

57 Mu'Min was convicted of the 1973 murder and robbery of a cab driver. The media released a statement
from the prosecutor to the effect that the death penalty was unavailable at the time of petitioner's earlier
conviction. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Mu'Min v. Virginia, I11 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
" Mu'Min had 23 prison rule violation citations. Id. at 6.
59 Id.

Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1901.
at 1902.
Id. at 1903. Four jurors were removed for cause by the trial judge: one equivocated as to her ability
to remain open-minded; another showed signs of prejudice toward those of the Islamic Faith; another
would have been unable to impose the death penalty, while yet another could not have considered a
penalty less than death. Id.
' Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 433, 443, 389 S.E.2d 886, 893 (1990).
6 Id. at 439-53, 389 S.E.2d at 890-98.
6 Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1903.
60

S Id.
62

66

Id.

6 Id. at 1905-06.
Published
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information.6 8
The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court divided its voir dire analysis of Mu'Min into two
separate categories of cases: (1) those like Aldridge and Rosales-Lopez that were
tried in federal courts, and therefore subject to the Court's supervisory powers; 69
and (2) those like Ham, Ristaino, and Turner that were tried in state courts,
meaning that the Court's authority was limited to enforcing the United States
Constitution.70 The Court noted that in the former group of cases voir dire is
conducted under the supervision of trial judges who rely largely on their
immediate perceptions, and that their sound discretion necessarily controls.7
The Court first sought to distinguish Aldridge and Rosales-Lopez from
Mu'Min on their facts. Mu'Min was not tried in a federal court, and therefore not
subject to the Court's supervisory powers. The Court then responded to
Mu'Min's two principle assertions: (1) "the Fourteenth Amendment requires more
in the way of voir dire with respect to pretrial publicity than...it does with respect
to racial... prejudice"72 ; and (2) "precise inquiries about the contents of any news
reports" that jurors might have read would materially assist in obtaining an
impartial jury.73 However, contrary to Mu'Min's assertions, the Court seemed
to think that the danger of racial prejudice in Ham, Ristaino, and Turner was
more violative of the Fourteenth Amendment than the possibility of prejudicial
pretrial publicity, and thus deserving of more voir dire than in Mu'Min. This
contention justified voir dire inquiry regarding racial prejudice in the foregoing
cases but not in Mu'Min.74 Second, the Court also felt that the trial judge's
conclusions as to impartiality, based on demeanor evidence and responses to
questions, were not easily subject to appellate review. 7 1 Third, the Court
rejected any constitutional requirement of content questioning despite the admitted
benefits in aiding the exercise of peremptory challenges. 76 Content questions
would only be constitutionally compelled if the trial court's failure to ask them
6

9 d.
" Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
Justice Rehnquist thought these cases gave the Court more latitude in setting standards for voir dire in
federal courts under its supervisory power than it had under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to
state courts. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct at 1904.
70
See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); and Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
71Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct at 1903-04.
72Id.

at 1904.

Id. at 1905.
1d. at 1904-05.
5Id. at 1904.
76 Id. at 1905.
74

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/9
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had rendered Mu'Min's trial fundamentally unfair."
The Court further reasoned that Mu'Min had misplaced his reliance on Irvin,
positing that Irvin did not clarify the requisite extent of a trial court's voir dire
inquiry."s Also, the Court pointed out that in Irvin eight of the twelve jurors had
actually formed an opinion as to petitioner's guilt, which was not true of the
jurors in Mu'Min." Moreover, the Court deemed the actual publicity in Irvin
more damaging than that found in Mu'Min. ° Distinguishing Mu'Min from
Patton as well, the Court again opined that the adverse publicity in Mu'Min was
not so damaging as to create the presumption of prejudice permitted in Patton."'
The Court continued its criticism of Mu'Min's assertions by underscoring his
misplaced reliance on the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
Justice." These rules require interrogation of each juror individually with respect
to what he has seen and heard about the case. In the Court's opinion, the ABA
standards for voir dire allegedly were constitutionally inapplicable because they
rendered a potential juror subject to challenge for cause without regard to his state
of mind. 3 The Court had not yet found the Constitution to require such a strict
standard." That a few states had adopted the ABA standards did not convince
the Court to incorporate those rules into the Fourteenth Amendment due process
requirements.85
Lastly, the Court examined the actual voir dire in Mu'Min and concluded
that it was "by no means perfunctory 6 and adequately covered the subject of
possible bias by pretrial publicity."8 7 Had any of the jurors claimed to have a
fixed opinion about the case, the Court may have then considered posing

7

Id. See also Murphy v. Florida, 421

U.S. 794, 799 (1975).

7 Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct at 1906-07.
79 Id.
at 1907.

so Id.
s1Id.
s Id. at 1907-08. On selecting the jury, the standards read as follows: "Both the degree of exposure and
the prospective juror's testimony as to state of mind are relevant to the determination of acceptability....
A prospective juror who has been exposed to and remembers reports of highly significant information,
such as the existence or contents of a confession, or other incriminating matters that may be inadmissible
as evidence, or substantial amounts of inflammatory material, shall be subject to challenge for cause
without regard to the prospective juror's testimony as to state of mind."
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.5 (b) (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).

s Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
"Id.
8 Id.
"6 Id.
87 Id.
Published
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extensive questions to succeeding jurors.8 8
Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor interpreted Mu'Min within the narrow confines of Patton.
She asserted that the issue before the Court was whether the trial court erred in
crediting the assurances of the eight jurors that they could put aside what they had
read or heard and render a fair verdict based on the evidence. 9 She supported
the majority's deference to the trial court's discretion in weighing its own
familiarity with the range of reported information against the jurors' assurances
of their abilities to remain impartial.9"
The Dissenting Opinion
1. Justice Marshall
Justice Marshall believed that the Mu'Min decision relegated the Sixth
Amendment's guarantees to a "hollow formality." 91 He criticized the majority's
reasoning as "unacceptable,"' suggesting instead that "a trial court cannot
without first establishing what the juror
realistically assess the juror's impartiality
93
already has learned about the case.
Justice Marshall considered the majority's evaluation of the publicity
engendered in Mu'Min as meaningless in view of the fact that two-thirds of the
seated jurors admitted to having read or heard about the case.94 He described the
barrage of publicity surrounding MuMin's case, emphasizing the political hotbed
created by the government's admission of lax supervision over the corrections
facilities. 95 He recited in detail the extent to which the public responded to the
invitation for stiffer restrictions and better policies in the Virginia Department of
Corrections.9 6
Justice Marshall's purpose in summarizing the specific news accounts was

s Id.
9

Id. at 1909 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

I&1d
Though Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority she did concede the fact that the trial judge could

have done more by asking the jurors to recount what they remembered reading about the case so as to
observe their tone of voice or demeanor. Id.
"' Id. at 1909 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
92Id. at 1910.

93Id.
4
'9
d.

"Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/9
"Id.
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to point out that anyone who read the reports would have come away with little
doubt that Mu'Min was fully capable of committing the brutal murder of which
he was accused.' He also wanted to stress that the real reason why the publicity
surrounding Mu'Min was so highly prejudicial was its usefulness to the prosecutor
in successfully securing the conviction of a detestable criminal.98
Justice Marshall clarified what he thought was the real issue in Mu'Min. He
disagreed with the majority's contention that the Court was asked to determine
merely the procedures necessary to assure the right to an impartial jury.99 His
prime contention was that once a prospective juror admits exposure to pretrial
publicity, content questioning must be part of the voir dire. In his opinion, the
trial court must do more than elicit a simple profession of open-mindedness before
swearing the person onto the jury.1°°
He posed three reasons in support of his rule. First, content questioning is
necessary to determine whether the type and extent of publicity to which a
prospective juror has been exposed would disqualify the juror as a matter of law,
thereby creating a strong presumption of prejudice. 0 ' Second, relying heavily
on Irvin and Rideau, Justice Marshall argued that content questioning was
"essential to give legal depth to the trial court's finding of impartiality"'1 2
because jurors cannot know when asked whether they are impartial under the
law. 10 3 Third, Justice Marshall viewed content questioning as a factfinding
facilitator with regard to assessing juror credibility.' °4 Justice Marshall labeled
the majority's deference to the trial court's discretion as an attempt to substitute
jurors with the judge's subjective awareness
the actual knowledge of prospective
10 5
publicity.
surrounding
of the
The quintessence of Justice Marshall's analysis is that jurors' assertions of
impartiality are insufficient to establish constitutional impartiality "when
meaningful steps can be taken to insulate the proceedings from juror bias without
compromising judicial efficiency."'' 1 6

Id. at 1911.
9' Id. at 1911-12. Justice Marshall cites a quotation by the local police chief who explained that "'[w]e
haven't lost very many [murder cases) lately.'" Itl at 1912.
9Id. His disagreement with the majority on this point eliminated any need to consider the racial-bias
cases and the extent to which they may have comparably required content questioning.
97

100

Id. at 1913-15.

'0' Id. at 1913.
102Id. at
30

1914.
Id. at 1914-15.

oId. at 1915.
306

Id.

'06 Id. at by
1916-17.
Published
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2. Justice Kennedy
Making reference to the Court's reliance on Irvin, Murphy and Patton,
wherein adverse pretrial publicity created a presumption of prejudice, Justice
Kennedy believed that Mu'Min did not fall within the same category of cases. 107
He opined that the real issue should be directed to the question of the actual
impartiality of the seated jurors: should their protestations of impartiality be
believed? 0 8 He rejected Justice Marshall's contention that an individual exposed
to publicity akin to that in Irvin should be disqualified regardless of how eamestly
he professes his impartiality.1°9 He did, however, agree with Justice Marshall
that the voir dire in Mu'Min was inadequate." 0 He contended that a juror's
admission of media exposure initiates a trial judge's duty to thoroughly assess that
juror's ability to remain impartial."' In his view, this determination is largely
one of demeanor and credibility." 2 He would have been satisfied if the trial3
judge in Mu'Min had questioned the jurors individually rather than in groups,"
therefore assuring that their responses did not infect the remainder of the
panel." 4 Under this analysis it appears that Justice Kennedy disagreed less with
the result than with the method of achieving it.
ANALYSIS
The Court's analysis in Mu'Min was based on a thorough interpretation of
impartiality-jurisprudence case law governing the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The effect of the Court's decision was to make a distinction between
appellate review procedures in state and federal cases." 5 It also attempted to
set a standard by which courts may consider allowing any presumptions of
prejudice to govern the voir dire.
Mu'Min and ConstitutionalGuarantees in State Criminal Trials
In Mu'Min the Court clearly refused to acknowledge any precedential value

'0

Id. at 1918 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

log Id.
109Id.
I10

1

Id.
Id.

112Id.
13

at 1919.

Id. Initially, the judge questioned the jurors as a single group, later conducting voir dire in groups of

four. Each group was asked about the effect on them of pretrial publicity or information, and whether they
had formed an opinion. Id. at 1902-03.
114Id. at 1919 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
115The majority acknowledges that the federal circuits that have mandated content questioning in pretrial
publicity cases have done so in the exercise of their supervisory powers and not as a matter of
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/9
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in the racial prejudice cases such as Ristaino, Ham, and Turner."6 Thus it
would seem as if the Court was suggesting that constitutional rights to impartiality
and fairness protect only certain classes of prejudice, or extend only to certain
groups in the population. Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to prohibit the states from invidiously discriminating on the
basis of race.' 7 However, the main purpose of the due process clause is to
insure the "essential demands of fairness.""' Therefore, it follows that state
incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment impartial jury principles" 9 must be
viewed more broadly than from a strict racial prejudice standpoint. A closer
reading of these cases in terms of their general rules of law may suggest that the
Court failed to scrupulously examine their overall similarities to Mu'Min.
In both Ham and Ristaino, the Court upheld the accused's right to examine
jurors on the voir dire as to the existence of a disqualifying state of mind with
respect to other races than the black race, and in relation to religious and "other
prejudices of a serious character.'"120 "Other prejudices of a serious character"
could certainly include prejudice resulting from inflammatory pretrial publicity as
in Mu'Min.
In Ristaino, the Court held that the inquiry into racial prejudice at voir dire
was not constitutionally required because the facts of the case did not suggest a
significant likelihood that such prejudice would infect the trial.' 2 1 In Ham, the
defendant's claim was that he had been framed because of his prominence in the
community as a civil rights activist. 122 Racial issues, therefore, were inextricably bound up in the conduct of the trial because his reputation was likely 23to
intensify any prejudice that individual jury members may have harbored.
Ham and Ristaino evoke the idea that under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, "special circumstances" may suggest the need for specific questioning:"
circumstances in which the particular prejudice sought to be avoided is
inextricably bound up with the facts of the trial.' 2
Viewed under this broad spectrum, the more appropriate question in Mu'Min

116

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

'" See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
I"' Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973).
"9 The Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1948).
'20 Aldridge v. United Stales. 283 U.S. 308, 313 (1931) (emphasis added).
12'

Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976).

'22Ham, 409 U.S. at 525.
-z Id. at 524-26.
'2 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596.
'2 Id. atby
597.
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is whether any prejudicial pretrial publicity was inextricably bound up with the
conduct of the trial. Clearly it was. The circumstances surrounding Mu'Min's
case reveal a constitutionally significant likelihood of bias and partiality requiring
judicial action. 26 The publicity contained detailed information regarding
Mu'Min's criminal and institutional records as well as statements by political
officials disgusted by the offense. 27 Political candidates used the case as a
rallying call for reform such that Mu'Min came to symbolize in the press all that
an outraged public thought wrong with the penal system. 12 The thrust of the
articles was to expose Mu'Min's case as a prime example of societal evils. There
were also numerous accounts regarding legislative and executive efforts to prevent
prisoners from being permitted to work in urban areas. 129 Certainly any
potential juror exposed to such propaganda could subconsciously have sought to
hold Mu'Min out as an example; as an inspiration for the prosecutor to assuage
public outrage and secure the death penalty. According to Ham and Ristaino,
under the circumstances in Mu'Min, whereby the trial publicity was so entwined
with an issue in the case, the "essential demands of fairness" embodied in the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required that Mu'Min's proposed questions 130 be asked. The predominant concern should have been the potential for
media-induced bias to deny Mu'Min a fair and impartial jury under the
circumstances.
ConstitutionalBearing of Trial Judges' Opinions as to Juror Impartiality
The Court reasoned that Mu'Min was not entitled to relief because the trial
judge found the jury panel impartial, and that this finding deserved great
deference.131 The Court's effort to extend comity to the state trial judge's
assessment of the jurors' demeanors ignores the constitutional inadequacy of the
inquiry that produced its findingsY3 Though the judge may have been aware
of the content of the news stories, he could not have known precisely which
stories the jurors themselves had been exposed to. 133 The majority agreed with
the rule in Patton that credibility determinations made by trial judges deserve
special deference. However, in Patton, the trial judge's finding of impartiality
deserved heightened deference because it was made only after extensive voir dire

See Mu'Min, 111 S. CL at 1901-03.
127Id. at 1910-12 (Marshall, I., dissenting).
"1

'n

Id.

L29id.
"' Mu'Min's counsel submitted a list of proposed voir dire questions to determine when, what, where,
how, and from whom information had been acquired about the case. Id. at 1902 n. 2.
...id. at 1906.

" Mu'Min does not dispute the fact that a trial judge is best situated to determine an individual juror's
competency to serve in a particular case. Id at 1904-05.
'3 Id. at 1915 (Marshall L, dissenting).
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regarding the media accounts to which the jurors had been exposed." 4 It thus
follows that there are circumstances under which the trial judge must conduct a
probing voir dire regarding adverse pretrial publicity. Accordingly, Mu'Min
correctly asserted that the adequacy of the judge's inquiry was not entirely
unreviewable based on the danger of bias in pretrial publicity cases.135 He
contended that a trial judge's assessments of juror impartiality in cases involving
adverse publicity should be reviewed on the basis of adequacy under the
36
circumstances,not on the basis of "manifest error" as proposed by the Court.
The majority also suggested that content questions will be necessary only
when a community has been saturated by a "wave of public passion, 137 as in
Irvin.138 The majority's argument misconstrues the point of Irvin. Irvin stood
for the proposition that when a community has been subject to unrelenting
prejudicial pretrial publicity, the entire community will be presumed both exposed
to and prejudiced by it.' 39 Similarly, Mu'Min argued that the publicity surrounding his trial was prejudicial enough to create a presumption of prejudice on
the part of any individual juror representing the infected community conscience.
This assertion is certainly validated by the jurors' responses during voir dire.
Two of the jurors excused for cause admitted that they could not enter the jury
box with an open mindY"' It stands to reason that even one such admission of
insurmountable partiality indicates the possibility of pervasive bias in the
remainder of the panel. 4 ' Thus in Mu'Min, the likelihood definitely existed
that a juror was jaundiced by prejudgment, mandating the state to screen out any
other fixed opinions through rigorous content questioning.
NonconstitutionalBases For Requiring Content Questions
First of all, the controversy unearthed in cases like Mu'Min portends the
adoption of state laws designed to give trial courts more leeway so as to
vouchsafe fair and impartial jury trials. The ABA standards 42 were cited with
approval by the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. 43 The
majority in Mu'Min rejects the constitutional necessity of these standards because
they do not necessarily require determination of a juror's state of mind upon
134
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).
'"
136

Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct 1899 (1991) (No. 90-5193).
id.

137
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
'38

Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct. at 1912-13 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

,'9 See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727-28.
140Mu'Min,

111 S.Ct. at 1903.
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1986).
'2 See supra note 82.
143 427 U.S. 539, 550 (1976).
141See
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exposure to highly prejudicial information.'" However, the Court promulgated
practically the same standards in Patton. It permitted a presumption of prejudice
without regard to a juror's actual
or partiality in the face of adverse publicity "'5
state of mind.
Secondly, as demonstrated in Sheppard, trial judges do not always fulfill
their duties to protect defendants from prejudicial publicity and disruptive
influences in the courtroom. 4 6 Accordingly, "[g]iven the pervasiveness of
modem communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from
the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that
the balance is never weighed against the accused" 47 and permit content
questioning during voir dire. The Supreme Court has recognized that trial judges
have the power to prevent attorneys, court personnel, parties, and witnesses, from
releasing information that would interfere with a fair trial.148 Therefore,
permitting content questions under potentially prejudicial circumstances merely
serves to purge the trial from the unbridled publicity permitted initially by officers
of the court. 4 9 Courts also have the power to grant continuances until the
15
threat abates, to grant changes of venue, and to sequester the jury sua sponte. 1
Though none of the foregoing measures are anything more than palliatives, they
represent the courts' alternatives to prevent frustration of its functioning fairly.
In deciding on methods of controlling the release of pretrial publicity, courts
must also recognize "a strong societal interest in public trials,"'15' and balance
it with the Sixth Amendment right of the defendant to a fair trial. As stated
earlier, the Supreme Court has long noted the unreliability of prospective jurors'
self-assessments of impartiality. In high publicity cases like Mu'Min conditions
of voir dire may operate to inhibit candid responses from jurors who are likely
to feel internal pressure to conform their answers to what they believe to be
socially acceptable answers.' 52 Also, in cases where there has been extensive
pretrial publicity, jurors are likely to be unaware of their own biases because the

' M Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct at 1908.
'45

Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031.

'46

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).

'47id.

at 362.

Id. at 363.
The Court's later decision in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991), provides a
149
marked contrast to Mu'Min on this point. It upheld a rule identical to Model Rules of Professional
Conduct rule 3.6 prohibiting a defense lawyer from making extrajudicial statements to the press that "'he
will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing [the trial].'" Id. at 2720. In light
knows ...
of this holding, the Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Mu'Min is unconvincing.
'5

Sheppard,384 U.S. at 363.

Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
'52
Carroll, Speaking the Truth: Voir Dire in the Capital Case, 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 199, 199-200
'54

(1979).
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is constrained by legal meanings not evident
very language used in the courtroom 53
law.'
the
in
untrained
to lay persons
In consideration of these potential interferences, the details of prospective
jurors' exposure to pretrial publicity must be probed sufficiently to permit the
court's fair determination of challenges for cause, and to provide counsel an
opportunity to preserve a record for appeal.
CONCLUSION

The crux of the problem presented in Mu'Min lies in applying the accused's
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury to the administration of criminal justice
in the state and federal courts. The tenor of skepticism exuded in Mu'Min reveals
the Court's reluctance to stray from strict, facial constitutional guarantees. In the
' % the
words of Lord Coke, a juror must be "indifferent as he stands unswom,"'M
"fundamental
integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial
' 55
by jury.
Notwithstanding the Justices' divergent approaches in analyzing the content
question issue in Patton, Irvin, and now Mu'Min, permanently-imbedded
fragments of constitutional adjudication have emerged unscathed. It is established
practice in the federal system that a prospective juror is presumed to be
prejudiced and should be excused when that juror has become aware, through
extrajudicial sources, that the defendant has a prior criminal record. 56 But and this is well-established - nothing in the Constitution compels the states' trial
courts to adopt a presumption of prejudice because such adoption is based on the
Court's federal supervisory powers.'57 Thus, a state trial court's failure to
employ the presumption is not cognizable error.'58
There is some support for the notion that prejudice can be presumed
regardless of whether the trial took place in federal or state court. However, this
is only permitted when pretrial publicity is so pervasive, inflammatory, and
widespread that the trial becomes "but a hollow formality."' 5 9 Mu'Min leaves

"5

Id. at 207-13.

"4

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878).

"9

Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965).

"4 Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d. 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1991). The court of appeals affirmed Britz's murder
conviction. Britz argued that the Illinois trial court had committed reversible error by declining his
requests for individual voir dire of each prospective juror outside the presence of the others. See People
v. Britz, 185 IlMApp. 3d. 191, 200, 541 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1989).

'"Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797-99 (1975).
Britz, 940 F.2d at 231.
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unaddressed the question of how to assure a greater degree of scrutiny during voir
dire in high publicity capital murder cases at the state level. Perhaps this is a job
for state legislatures to handle.
In sum, as in Mu'Min where a defendant's life is at stake, it is not requiring
too much that he be tried in the most impartial atmosphere possible. Therefore,
states must work to assure reliability in the process by which a person's life is
taken and require content questions in hyper-publicity cases. The only way to
inject this element is to recognize that the right to challenge has little or no
meaning unaccompanied by preservation of a defendant's right to prove actual
bias through relevant, probing questions.
CHERYL A. WADDLE

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/9

18

